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 Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on earning management 
and accounting conservatism by European countries. Using firm-level data of nine 
European countries within G20 who mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005, we found that 
IFRS either increase or decrease accounting conservatism within the sample countries. 
With Mishkin test to market efficiency at valuation with disaggregated earning 
components, the results show that the accrual anomaly is not a generalized phenomenon 
within Europe, especially the Common Law countries. The market seems to be less able 
to distinguish abnormal accrual from normal accrual estimated by Jones model, which in 
term cause the mis-valuation of the future earnings forecast. Cross country characteristics 
examination, including law enforcement, protection of shareholder and accounting 
structure, etc. suggests that the change of accounting standard itself cannot solely 
improve the valuation information environment. Relevant commercial law should change 
to support IFRS to make accounting information informative and comparable.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Recent years saw the important accounting regulatory change with EU and all around the 
world is the mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS). In 
2002, the European Union required all member countries to mandatory adopt IFRS from 
2005. The main purpose is to make all the data from financial statement comparable. 
Despite the costly and huge change, till now there is very few researches as to the related 
economic impact (Ball, 2006).  
One of the most discussed topics in accounting research area is the earning management. 
It is arguable that managers manipulate earnings through accruals. Sloan (1996) first 
introduced Mishkin test to test the market efficiency in accounting area. They pointed out 
that the mis-valuation of the stock return is due to the fact that market overweighed the 
persistence of total accruals. However, Pincus et al (2007) found that accrual anomaly is 
not a generalised phenomenon. It happens most in Common Law countries, but not in 
Code Law countries.  
While at the same time, it is argued that accounting conservatism, which is defined as 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings, could mitigate earning management. In general,  the 
earnings conservatism principle is that future bad news is anticipated, whereas future 
good news is not. However there is very few researches focus on both earning 
management and accounting conservatism.  
The motivation of this research is two folded: the first one is to investigate the possible 
combination effect of accounting conservatism and earning management. We examine 
the accounting conservatism as well as the accrual anomaly in the nine European 
countries of G20 who have already mandatorily adopted IPRS from 2005, to see the 
possible impact of the mandatory adoption of IFRS on the market efficiency of valuation 
model. Secondly following Byard et al (2011)’s approach, investigation is conducted as 
to examine whether the change to IFRS solely can change accounting information 
environment.  
Literature Review 
One of the important topics in financial reporting is the extent to which managers 
manipulate reported earnings, which in term affects the correct pricing of the market 
stock price. Healy (1985) used accrual-based measurement to test earning management 
hypothesis; and after this significant researches have been done with the adoption of the 
accrual-based approach. According to this theory, the accruals are the main difference 
between earning and cashflows in valuation models. Under accrual accounting system, 
managers manipulated earning only through accruals rather than cash accounts; therefore 
the cash should be more persistent than accruals.  However, when employing this 
approach, significant obstacle is associated as to correctly separate total accruals into 
normal and abnormal accruals. The most frequently used techniques to estimate the 
normal accruals are the cross-sectional versions of the standard-Jones model or the 
modified-Jones model, and the abnormal accrual works as a proxy for managerial 
discretion. (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995, Erickson and Wang, 1999, et al) It is 
obvious that the precision in estimating the normal accrual is vital to detect earning 
management. After Dechow et al (1995), Kang and Shivaramakrishnan (1995), Guay et 
al. (1996) and Sloan (1996), substantial researches have reported the imprecision of the 
normal accrual estimated by Jones (1991) model(hereafter the Jones model), as the 
residuals capture not only managerial discretion, but also unusual nondiscretionary 
accruals and unintentional misstatements(Xie, 2001). Peasnell et al. (2000) developed 
‘marginal model’ to detect earning management. Using UK non-financial companies, 
their results suggested that marginal model is relatively superior to both Jones model and 
modified Jones model when cash slow performance is extreme.  
Another stream of research focused on the market pricing with cash flows, earning or 
accruals. In other words, whether the stock price correctly reflects the implications 
provided by accounting information. Jones (1991) examined whether the market price 
rationally reflected one-year ahead earning implications, which incorporated 
discretionary accrual (hereafter abnormal accrual). She provided empirical evidence that 
abnormal accruals are positively associated with future profitability. Subramanyam 
(1996), however, argued that the positive relationship does not necessarily suggest that 
market rationally prices either earnings or accruals.  
After Mishkin(1983) who introduced Mishkin test as a statistical comparison between the 
market pricing and the forecast pricing, Sloan (1996) employed Mishkin test in 
investigating the market pricing of total accruals. The empirical evidence from US 
suggested that the market overprices the persistent of accrual component of earnings. 
Collins and Hribar (2000) provided evidences to support Sloan’s argument that the 
market overweighed the total accruals of earnings with the same methodology. Xie (2001) 
pointed out that both Sloan(1996) and Collins and Hribar (2000) did not investigate 
whether the market mis-pricing is due to  normal accrual (non-discretionary accrual) or 
abnormal accrual (discretionary accrual).  
Xie (2001) separated total accrual into normal accrual and abnormal accrual component 
with Jones model and then examined the market efficiency with Mishkin test. At the 
same time they controlled major unusual accruals and non-articulation events (i.e. 
mergers, acquisitions or divestitures). Their results suggest that in the forecast model the 
abnormal accrual is less persistent than normal accrual, which in term, is less persistent 
than cash flow. In the return model, results suggested that the market does not correctly 
anticipate the possible reversal of abnormal accrual component. Kraft et al (2007) argues 
that when Sloan (1996) first employed Mishkin test, he has clearly mentioned that there 
would be possible biases because of the ignorance of possible variables with co-relation 
with cash flow or total accruals. Therefore they replicated Mishkin test with US data with 
other possible explanatory variables, such as market value, earning to price ratio, etc. The 
results showed that when these variables are included in the forecast and return model, 
the mis-pricing disappeared. They, in turn, argued that when sample size is big enough, 
the OLS regression result is not significantly different from the result produced by 
Mishkin test.  
Pincus(2007) extended the investigation to international wide. They found market 
overweighs accruals is a generalised phenomenon in common law countries, but not in 
code law countries. The results also suggested that the occurrence of accrual anomaly is 
due to differences in accounting system and institutional structures. Basically accrual 
anomaly is more likely to occur in countries with a common law tradition, with more 
extensive use of accrual accounting and having a lower concentration of share ownership. 
However, the possible limitation of their research is that the sample period is between 
1994 and 2002, the paper cannot cover the period after the adoption of International 
Accounting Standard.  
Recently Byard et al (2011) examined the effect of the mandatory adoption of 
International Financial Reporting (IFRS) by the European Union on financial analysts’ 
information environment. They found that the impact occurs in those countries with both 
strong enforcement regimes and domestic accounting standards that differ significantly 
from IFRS. Hence, the change of accounting standard cannot solely improve the market 
pricing environment.  
However, the earning management behaviour can be mitigated by employing 
conservative accounting. According to Basu(1997), the accounting conservatism caused 
by the asymmetric treatment of possible future gains or losses in the relevant profit and 
loss accounts. This is because that the recognition of future losses is on a timelier basis 
than that of future gain. Givoly and Hayn (2000) pointed out that giving long enough 
time scale, accrual based earning will converge to the true economic performance, as the 
accounting conservatism is the accounting conservatism is the difference of timing and 
sequencing of recognised earning and the associated cash flows. Lafond and Watts (2008) 
showed that accounting conservatism can reduce the manager’s ability of earning 
manipulation. With the adoption of IFRS from 2005, it is argued that earning 
management should be controlled and information asymmetric should be improved. 
Therefore considering the beneficiary aspect of conservative accounting, we would 
expect that the adoption of conservative accounting would reduce accrual anomaly.  
The contribution of our research to the existent literature is three-folded. First, we extend 
Peasnell et al. (2000)’s work to detect earning management with marginal model. With 
data spanning from 1990 to 2010, we investigate whether the adoption of IFRS in the 
European Union countries helps to mitigate manager’s earning management. Secondly, 
we would use Mishkin’s test to investigate market efficiency of the EU countries. It 
would be interesting to see whether the change of accounting system solely can change 
the status of market pricing. Thirdly we would investigate the effect of legal enforcement 
and accounting system would affect accrual anomaly.  
Sample 
Our analysis examines 9 European countries in G20, including United Kingdom, France, 
Germany, Italy, Netherland, Spain, Denmark, Sweden and Switzerland. The sample 
period span from 1990 to 2010. We start from the point that to include all the population 
of firms on the Datastream ‘Live’ and ‘Dead” stock files with the accounting data needed 
by Jone’s model, Peasnell et al (2000)’s model and Mishkin’s test. We hereby exclude all 
financial firms as their different financial reporting environment and the way accruals are 
calculated and recorded. We also exclude those companies for which returns and scaled 
accruals lie outside the five and 95% percentiles.  
All the accounting data collected are at the end of fiscal year, except that the stock return 
is collected and calculated three month after the fiscal year to allow the information to be 
incorporated into the stock price.  
The sampling criteria result in a final total sample of 38,880 firm-year observations, 
comprising 4,995 individual firms.  
Empirical Result 
1. Detect Accounting Conservatism 
 The following models proposed by Basu (1997) will be estimated to investigate 
accounting conservatism: 
                                   +                                                (1) 
                            +                                                          (2)  
                                +                                                    (3) 
where: 
Net income: is the net income 
CFO: operating cash flow 
Accrual: the different between net income and operating cash flow
1
 
R: one year buy and hold stock return
2
 
RD: is a dummy variable. RD is 1 when R is negative or is 0 when R is positive 
The results are listed in Table 1. The coefficient    in equation (1) captures the increase 
in the strength of the relationship between Earning and stock return when bad 
performance in the future is anticipated. This coefficient is the Basu (1997)’s measure of 
                                                          
1
 As Xie (2001) mentioned that Collins and Hribar (2000) suggest that total accruals measured directly 
from cash flow statement are accurate, while total accruals estimated using a balance sheet approach 
contain measurement error. Therefore the method used by Xie (2001) will be used in this paper to work out 
the total accruals.  
2
 Following Sloan (1996) and Xie (2000), we collect the return data three month after the fiscal year to 
allow the accounting information to be reflected in the stock price. 
earnings conservatism, since it is entirely due to earnings capturing anticipated bad 
performance in the future. From the results in Table 1, it is suggested that most of all the 
    of the countries except Spain are significant at 99% significant level, with an average 
coefficient of 0.127, which is almost the same as Basu(1997)’s result of an average 
coefficient of 0.13. Among all the countries, Spain has the major problem of missing data; 
therefore the result may suffer higher standard deviation and possible surviving bias. 
United Kingdom has the highest coefficient of earning conservatism of 0.303. This result 
is in line with other relevant researches that earning conservatism is more prominent in 
Common Law countries. In our sample, only United Kingdom is Common law country.  
If equation (1) correctly captures possible accounting conservatism, the    in equation (2) 
should be insignificant, as the cash flow component should not be affected by the bad 
news anticipation in the future. Our results are consistent with Basu(1997)’s results that 
the coefficient of the possible impact of future bad news on the cash flow is still 
significant. This is not as expected by Basu(1997), and one the possible explanations is 
that the    captured by equation (1) does not solely reflect the accrual factor. The 
possible earning conservatism through accruals should be reflected by the difference 
between the two     estimated by equation (1 )and (2). Our results suggest that most of 
the dif 
ferences among all the sampled countries are positive, with an average of 0.04.  The only 
exceptions are France and Spain.  
The result of equation (3) shows that although the average    coefficient of all the sample 
countries is 0.025, which is much lower than the    coefficient estimated by equation (1), 
it is more or less the same as captured by the difference between two     from equation 
(1) and (2).  
In Table 2 and Table 3, we listed the results with sub-sample period from 1990 to 2004 
and the sub-sample period from 2005 to 2010. It would be interested to see whether the 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in EU from 2005 will have impact on the accounting 
conservatism or not. The results suggest that there is no difference between the period 
before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS. The more conservative accounting 
standard implied by IFRS does not seem to increase the earning conservatism in financial 
reporting.  
As Peasnell et al (2000) suggested, the early recognition of future bad performance may 
be realised through non-operating as well as operating accruals. Therefore the following 
model will be estimated to detect possible accounting conservatism: 
            +                                                       (4) 
where: 
      is the change in net sales 
     is property, plant, and equipment defined by IFRS 
Significant coefficient of    or    suggests accounting conservatism. The results are 
listed in Table 4, among which Panel A shows the results of the whole sample period and 
the sub-sample periods before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 2005. The 
results suggest that not all the sample countries have accounting conservatism. Among all 
the sample countries, United Kingdom has the highest coefficient of earning 
conservatism. The other two countries are Germany and Denmark.  
2. Market efficiency 
In this section we will look into the market efficiency of the sample countries. Sloan 
(1996), Xie (2001) and Pincus et al (2007) tested the market efficiency, where Sloan 
(1996) first adopted Mishkin’s test to apply into accounting information efficiency. Xie 
(2001) in term disaggregate earning components into operating cash flow, normal accrual 
and abnormal accrual components. Both of them examined the US market. Pincus et al 
(2007) extended the investigation into international market. Their sample includes 
countries using Common Law and countries using Code Law. However their sample 
spanned only to 2002, it cannot show whether the mandatory adoption of IFRS will have 
impact on the market pricing.  
In Table 5, we list the results estimated by Mishkin test with the following model: 
                                          (5) 
                                 -  
    
        
                        (6) 
Where:  
           is the net income scaled by end-of-year total assets 
     is operating cash flow 
         is the difference between earning and operating cash flow 
           is size-adjusted abnormal returns define by Xie (2001) 
We estimate equation (5) and (6) jointly as mentioned by Mishkin (1983). If the market is 
efficient, we would expect to see no difference between either   
  and   , or   
  and   . 
Panel A is the results for the whole sample period, while Panel B and Panel C list the 
results for both sub-sample periods before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS in 
2005. Generally the results show that the cash flow persistence is higher than accrual 
persistence, which is in consistence with Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001). However, 
different from Sloan (1996) and Xie (2001)’s empirical results for US market; there is no 
significant evidence showing that the market overprice the persistence of accrual. Our 
results are in line with Pincus et al (2007) of European countries that there is no accrual 
abnormal in Code Law countries. It is suggested by our evidence that the only one 
Common Law country United Kingdom does not have accrual abnormal as well. Most of 
all the countries have lower coefficients for both cash flow and accruals in the valuation 
model than those in the forecasting model, suggesting that the market under-prices either 
cash from operations or accruals relative to its ability to forecast one-year-ahead earnings.  
We, therefore, in term estimate the following model used by Xie (2001) to disaggregate 
the total accrual into normal accrual and abnormal accrual components. This has not been 
done in studies covering countries international wide.  
                                                                 (7) 
                                    
    
        
                 
  
                                     (8) 
here: 
Normal Accrual is the estimated accrual forecast by Jones model (Jone, 1991), and the 
abnormal accrual is the residue of the estimated model.  
According to Xie (2001), the cash flow should have the highest coefficient, suggesting 
that the persistence of cash flow is the highest. It should be higher than the coefficient of 
normal accrual, which, in term, should be higher than the coefficient of abnormal accrual. 
The results are listed in Table 6, with Panel A showing the results for all sample period 
and Panel B and Panel C with sub-sample periods before and after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS in 2005. The results are very informative, suggesting that investors are 
less able to distinguish between normal accruals and abnormal accruals. Although there is 
some change after 2005, which is the switch between the weights put on the valuation of 
normal accrual and abnormal accrual. But the results suggest that investors are less likely 
to correctly estimate the normal accrual. This result has practical implication that 
investors are less able to correctly valuate the future earning with accrual components.  
3. Cross-country differences in institutional and Accounting Structures 
Pincus et al (2007) investigated the possible impact of country specific characteristics, 
such as legal tradition, shareholder protections to mitigate earning management, 
characteristics of equity market or accounting structure on the earning management. 
Recently Byard et al (2011) examined the impact of similar characteristics on the 
information environment after mandatory adoption of IFRS in European countries. We 
therefore apply similar approach to combine both Pincus et al (2007) and Byard et al 
(2011)’s variables together to examine the possible impact of the mandatory adoption of 
IFRS on earning management. For sample period before 2005, we estimate the following 
models:  
                                                
                                                       
                    
 
                                                       
                                         
                    
 
                                                           
                                         
                    
 
                               
                                              
                                          
                     
where: 
The data of Law Enforcement and Difference between domestic accounting and IFRS are 
collected from Byard et al (2011), the accrual index is an equally weighted index of 11 
accrual-related accounting standards in each country developed by Hung (2000). 
Ownership concentration is the median of the percentage of common shares owned bt the 
three largest stockholders in the ten largest privately owned nonfinancial firms, 
developed by La Porta et al. (1998). The importance of equity market is collected from 
La Porta et al. (1997), and Anti-director rights index is collected by La Porta et al. (1996). 
And for the sample after 2005, we dropped out independent variables as IFRS difference 
and Accrual Index.
3
 
The results are listed in Table 7. Panel A listed the results for the sample period before 
2005. It is interesting to see that although some of the country characteristics are not 
significant, while when included, the earning management disappeared. The Importance 
of Equity Market is significant in all the four models. In the sample period after 2005, the 
results suggest that the earning management cannot be erased because of the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. These results are consistent with Byard et al (2011)’s results that 
information environment is only improved when country is with strong law enforcement 
and big difference between domestic accounting system and IFRS.  
Conclusion 
We investigate the accounting conservatism as well as the market efficiency in valuation 
the one-year-ahead return in the nine European countries of G20, who have already 
mandatorily adopted IFRS in 2005. Our empirical results with sample spanning 1990-
2010 suggest that accounting conservatism existed both before and after the mandatory 
adoption of IFRS. The change into IFRS does not increase of decrease earning 
conservatism. The Mishkin test of the market efficiency in valuation with total accrual 
                                                          
3
 The ignorance of the fact that some of the companies that do not provide consolidated statement may 
still use domestic accounting standard may lead to estimation bias.  
shows that the accrual anomaly does not exist in Common law countries in the EU as 
well as in the UK. The further investigation with disaggregation of total accrual into 
normal accrual and abnormal accrual shows that the market cannot distinguish abnormal 
accrual from normal accrual. The mispricing of future earning based on cash flow and 
accruals could be due to the inability to distinguish the abnormal accrual from normal 
accrual. Finally the cross country characteristics and accounting structure investigation 
shows that the change of accounting structure itself cannot significantly improve the 
quality of information, which in term, will affect the valuation.  
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Table 1: Earning conservatism detection sample period 1990-2010 
    
Net Income 
Model (1) 
CFO 
Model (2) 
Difference 
btw (1) and 
(2) 
Accruals 
Model (3)  
No of 
Observations 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
 
  
RD 0.004 -0.0096  0.006 1828 
t-stat (0.57) (-1.12)  (0.89)  
Return -0.001 0.015  -0.01  
t-stat (-0.06) (1.04)  (-1.16)  
Return*RD 0.12*** 0.073*** 0.047 0.03**  
t-stat (7.06) (3.94)  (2.02)  
   0.09 0.06  0.003  
 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
RD -0.004 -0.005  -0.006 6865 
t-stat (-0.74) (-0.19)  (-0.23)  
Return -0.01 -0.0005  -0.012  
t-stat (-1.42 (-0.01)  (-0.32)  
Return*RD 0.106*** 0.138*** -0.032 -0.039  
t-stat (11.40) (2.87)  (-0.81)  
   0.06 0.005  0.0006  
 
  
  
Germany 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.0065 -0.01**  -0.003 7685 
t-stat (-1.37) (-2.26)  (-0.37)  
Return 0.006 0.021**  -0.024**  
t-stat (0.68) (2.31)  (-2.29)  
Return*RD 0.129*** 0.064*** 0.065 0.039***  
t-stat (11.5) (5.63)  (3.06)  
   0.09 0.05  0.01  
 
  
  
Italy 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.005 -0.01**  0.006 2524 
t-stat (-1.21) (-2.36)  (0.85)  
Return 0.005 0.014  0.002  
t-stat (0.70) (1.52)  (0.18)  
Return*RD 0.055*** 0.016 0.039 0.014  
t-stat (5.94) (1.33)  (1.01)  
   0.08 0.03  0.001  
  
  
Netherland 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.008 -0.015*  0.000 1878 
t-stat (-0.96) (-1.84)  0.000  
Return -0.009 0.019  -0.027**  
t-stat (-0.75) (1.58)  (-2.42)  
Return*RD 0.107*** 0.028* 0.079 0.055***  
t-stat (6.51) (1.78)  (3.59)  
   0.07 0.04  0.007  
 
 
 
Table 1 (continued) 
    
Net Income 
Model (1) 
CFO 
Model (2) 
Difference 
btw (1) and 
(2) 
Accruals 
Model (3)  
No of 
Observations 
  
  
  
Spain 
 
  
  
  
RD -0.005 -0.012  0.005 560 
t-stat (-0.66) (-1.03)  (0.56)  
Return 0.022 0.02  -0.015  
t-stat (1.63) (1.03)  (-0.98)  
Return*RD -0.005 -0.007 -0.012 0.026  
t-stat (-0.30) (-0.29)  (1.29)  
   0.03 0.02  0.005  
  
  
Sweden 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.001 -0.029**  0.003 3730 
t-stat (-0.09) (-2.49)  (0.36)  
Return 0.009 -0.009  -0.007  
t-stat (0.53) (-0.60)  (-0.53)  
Return*RD 0.233*** 0.169*** 0.064 0.055***  
t-stat (10.63) (8.96)  (3.45)  
   0.14 0.1  0.009  
  
  
Switzerland 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.0011 -0.003  -0.001 2544 
t-stat (-0.22) (-0.57)  (-0.28)  
Return -0.007 0.013*  -0.013**  
t-stat (-0.88) (1.72)  (-2.08)  
Return*RD 0.093*** 0.035*** 0.058 0.021**  
t-stat (8.41) (3.21)  (2.43)  
   0.07 0.04  0.1  
  
  
United 
Kingdom 
  
  
  
RD 
-0.036*** 
-
0.036*** 
 
-0.007 
11266 
t-stat (-3.69) (-3.38)  (-1.14)  
Return 
-0.059*** 
-
0.058*** 
 
0.0069 
 
t-stat (-3.75) (-3.65)  (0.75)  
Return*RD 0.303*** 0.25*** 0.053 0.0011  
t-stat (15.42) (12.52)  (0.23)  
   0.07 0.04  0.001  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Earning Conservatism detection sample period 1990-2004 
    
Net Income 
Model (1) 
CFO 
Model (2) 
Difference 
btw (1) 
and (2) 
Accruals 
Model (3)  
No of 
Observations 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
 
  
RD 0.006 -0.0087  0.01 1263 
t-stat (0.78) (-0.93)  (1.23)  
Return 0.020 0.032**  -0.007  
t-stat (1.43) (1.98)  (-0.49)  
Return*RD 0.095*** 0.048** 0.047 0.022*  
t-stat (4.95) (2.18)  (1.70)  
   0.10 0.07  0.004  
 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
RD 0.0008 0.0029  -0.0076 3720 
t-stat (0.11) (0.07)  (-0.17)  
Return -0.005 -0.0053  -0.0012  
t-stat (-0.48) (-0.06)  (-0.02)  
Return*RD 0.1144*** 0.1939** -0.0795 -0.090  
t-stat (9.01) (2.33)  (-1.09)  
   0.07 0.005 
 0.001  
 
  
  
Germany 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.01 
-
0.0075037 
 
-0.0073 
3975 
t-stat (-1.24) (-0.86)  (-0.68)  
Return -0.0181 0.0088  -0.0198  
t-stat (-1.54) (0.70)  (-1.27)  
Return*RD 0.1686*** 0.0946*** 0.074 0.0284  
t-stat (11.92) (6.23)  (1.51)  
   0.13 0.06  0.0007  
 
  
  
Italy 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.0041 -0.0175**  0.0143 1341 
t-stat (-0.71) (-2.04)  (1.32)  
Return 0.0111 0.0199  0.0066  
t-stat (1.29) (1.55)  (0.40)  
Return*RD 0.0635*** 0.0112 0.0523 0.0297  
t-stat (5.28) (0.61)  (1.30)  
   0.12 0.04 
 0.004  
  
  
Netherland 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.0082 -0.0131  0.0042 1303 
t-stat (-0.86) (-1.55)  (0.43)  
Return -0.0115 0.0138  -0.023  
t-stat (-0.83) (0.97)  (-1.60)  
Return*RD 0.1021*** 0.039** 0.0631 0.056***  
t-stat (5.34) (2.01)  (2.86)  
   0.06 0.04  0.007  
 
 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
 
 
Net Income 
Model (1) 
CFO 
Model (2) 
Difference 
btw (1) 
and (2) 
Accruals 
Model (3)  
No of 
Observations 
 
  
  
Spain 
 
  
  
  
RD -0.0289 -0.041  -0.004 58 
t-stat (-1.08) (-0.87)  (-0.12)  
Return 0.0477 0.1525*  -0.0863  
t-stat (0.98) (1.78)  (-1.31)  
Return*RD -0.0641 -0.2217 0.1576 0.0202  
t-stat (-0.83) (-1.63)  (0.19)  
   0.08 0.12 
 0.07  
  
  
Sweden 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.011 -0.0178  -0.015 1863 
t-stat (-0.72) (-1.24)  (-1.45)  
Return -0.025 -0.026  -0.0223*  
t-stat (-1.28) (-1.46)  (-1.75)  
Return*RD 0.266*** 0.2038*** 0.0622 0.059***  
t-stat (10.91) (8.95)  (3.65)  
   0.19 0.13  0.01  
  
  
Switzerland 
  
  
  
  
RD 0.0050 -0.0004  0.0023 1607 
t-stat (0.90) (-0.07)  (0.48)  
Return 0.0077 0.021**  -0.0068  
t-stat (0.89) (2.35)  (-0.91)  
Return*RD 0.089*** 0.0339*** 0.0551 0.023**  
t-stat (7.24) (2.67)  (2.21)  
   0.10 0.05  0.004  
  
  
United 
Kingdom 
  
  
  
RD -0.027** -0.0213*  -0.0044 5888 
t-stat (-2.44) (-1.82)  (-0.71)  
Return -0.094*** -0.0467**  -0.0131  
t-stat (-5.33) (-2.52)  (-1.33)  
Return*RD 
0.364*** 0.241*** 
0.123 0.0354**
* 
 
t-stat (15.87) (9.97)  (2.76)  
   0.09 0.04  0.002  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Earning management detection sample period 2005-2010 
   
Net Income 
Model (1) 
CFO 
Model (2) 
Difference 
btw (1) 
and (2) 
Accruals 
Model (3)  
No of 
Observations 
 
 
Denmark 
 
 
 
  
RD 0.0036 -0.0101  0.0002 565 
t-stat (0.20) (-0.54)  (0.01)  
Return -0.029 -0.016  -0.019  
t-stat (-1.04) (-0.56)  (-0.89)  
Return*RD 0.1505*** 0.1169 0.0336 0.0204  
t-stat (4.32) (3.32)  (0.77)  
   0.08 0.07  0.002  
 
 
 
France 
 
 
 
 
RD -0.0105 -0.0164  -0.0015 3145 
t-stat (-1.53) (-1.28)  (-0.12)  
Return -0.0177 0.006  -0.0275  
t-stat (-1.64) (0.30)  (-1.40)  
Return*RD 0.0956*** 0.065** 0.0306 0.0298  
t-stat (6.95) (2.55)  (1.19)  
   0.05 0.02  0.0009  
 
  
  
Germany 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.0093 -0.024**  0.0027 3710 
t-stat (-0.98) (-2.56)  (0.30)  
Return 0.0333** 0.036***  -0.028**  
t-stat (2.41) (2.62)  (-2.15)  
Return*RD 0.0721*** 0.0245 0.0476 0.046***  
t-stat (4.02) (1.38)  (2.72)  
   0.05 0.04  0.002  
 
  
  
Italy 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.0058 -0.01  -0.0014 1183 
t-stat (-0.86) (-1.37)  (-0.19)  
Return -0.0061 -0.0002  -0.0006  
t-stat (-0.51) (-0.01)  (-0.05)  
Return*RD 0.0555 0.029* 0.0265 0.0037  
t-stat (3.81) (1.80)  (0.23)  
   0.05 0.03  0.0003  
  
  
Netherland 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.007 -0.012  -0.009 575 
t-stat (-0.44) (-0.84)  (-0.85)  
Return -0.002 0.0343  -0.04**  
t-stat (-0.09) (1.60)  (-2.20)  
Return*RD 0.113*** 0.0003 0.1127 0.054***  
t-stat (3.56) (0.01)  (2.35)  
   0.09 0.04  0.01  
 
 
 
Table 3(continued) 
 
 
Net Income 
Model (1) 
CFO 
Model (2) 
Difference 
btw (1) 
and (2) 
Accruals 
Model (3)  
No of 
Observations 
 
  
  
Spain 
 
  
  
  
RD -0.001 -0.0085  0.005 502 
t-stat (-0.19) (-0.72)  (0.56)  
Return 0.0196 0.0086  -0.009  
t-stat (1.43) (0.45)  (-0.58)  
Return*RD 0.0007 0.0091 -0.008 0.022  
t-stat (0.04) (0.37)  (1.13)  
   0.03 0.01  0.003  
  
  
Sweden 
  
  
  
  
RD 0.014 -0.036**  0.024 1867 
t-stat (0.61) (-1.97)  (1.44)  
Return 0.053* 0.013  0.0136  
t-stat (1.72) (0.51)  (0.60)  
Return*RD 0.1914 0.129*** 0.0624 0.046  
t-stat (5.11) (4.22)  (1.63)  
   0.11 0.08  0.008  
  
  
Switzerland 
  
  
  
  
RD -0.01 -0.0054  -0.0075 937 
t-stat (-1.02) (-0.55)  (-1.08)  
Return 
-0.035** -0.0008 
 -
0.024** 
 
t-stat (-2.26) (-0.05)  (-2.28)  
Return*RD 0.107*** 0.043** 0.064 0.0183  
t-stat (4.98) (2.07)  (1.25)  
   0.05 0.02  0.006  
  
  
United 
Kingdom 
  
  
  
RD -0.042** -0.05***  -0.007 5378 
t-stat (-2.50) (-2.81)  (-0.68)  
Return -0.0114 -0.071**  0.034**  
t-stat (-0.41) (-2.59)  (2.02)  
Return*RD 0.224*** 0.251*** -0.027 -0.036*  
t-stat (6.76) (7.62)  (-1.82)  
   0.06 0.04  0.002  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Earning Management Detection 
            +                                               
Panel A: Whole sample period (1994-2010) 
 
                
   
Denmark 
 0.050*** -0.001 0.019** 0.033** -0.04*** 0.05 
t-stat (4.95) (-0.09) (2.36) (2.33) (-2.29)  
France 
 0.02 0.010 0.018 0.033 0.001 0.0008 
t-stat (0.64) (0.18) (0.82) (0.76) (0.02)  
Germany 
 0.02*** -0.068*** -0.025*** 0.024*** 0.078*** 0.019 
t-stat (3.75) (-4.74) (-3.48) (3.63) (3.80)  
Italy 
 0.062*** -0.026*** 0.0065 -0.033* 0.027* 0.015 
t-stat (4.83) (-3.22) 1.19 (-1.80) (1.67)  
Netherland 
 0.08*** -0.044*** 0.013 -0.0003 -0.030 0.11 
t-stat (11.72) (-3.09) (1.61) (-0.03) (-1.34)  
Spain 
 0.046** 0.003 0.020* -0.030 -0.035 0.01 
t-stat (2.00) (0.20) (1.91) (-0.82) (-1.5)  
Sweden 
 0.04*** 0.015 -0.023*** -0.0022 0.030 0.01 
t-stat (4.26) (0.77) (-2.63) (-0.17) (1.06)  
Switzerland 
 0.009* -0.042*** -0.003 0.0077 0.0072 0.02 
t-stat (1.85) (-5.99) (-0.68) (0.86) (0.68)  
UK 
 0.004*** 0.017*** -0.004 -0.035*** -0.011 0.007 
t-stat (4.66) (2.93) (-0.87) (-7.28) (-1.27)  
***, **, * stands for significant at 99%, 95% and 90% level using a two-tailed binomial test separately 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B: sample period before mandatory adoption of IFRS (1994-2004) 
 
                
   
Denmark 
 0.044*** -0.048*** 0.0053 0.047*** -0.0065 0.06 
t-stat (3.92) (-2.85) (0.53) (2.95) (-0.37)  
France 
 0.0182 -0.0055 0.0517 0.0045 -0.091 0.0006 
t-stat (0.33) (-0.06) (1.17) (0.06) (-0.62)  
Germany 
 -0.0011 -0.077*** -0.032** 0.0246** 0.0821** 0.006 
t-stat (-0.10) (-3.41) (-2.77) (2.36) (2.52)  
Italy 
 0.0216 -0.042*** 0.0087 -0.009 0.0492** 0.009 
t-stat (0.97) (-2.74) (0.97) (-0.28) (1.89)  
Netherland 
 0.087*** -0.041** 0.0229** 0.0111 -0.052* 0.13 
t-stat (10.27) (-2.20) (2.05) (0.79) (-1.76)  
Spain 
 0.011 -0.0578 0.0167 0.1732 0.03 0.08 
t-stat (0.10) (-0.73) (0.35) (1.05) (0.26)  
Sweden 
 0.030*** 0.0236 -0.03*** -0.0145 0.0249 0.02 
t-stat (2.80) (1.22) (-2.68) (-0.98) (0.86)  
Switzerland 
 0.0049 -0.042*** -0.0009 0.0052 -0.0018 0.03 
t-stat (0.68) (-4.77) (-0.14) (-0.44) (-0.14)  
UK 
 -0.02*** 0.005 0.0002 0.0182*** -0.039*** 0.009 
t-stat (-4.43) (0.77) (0.04) (2.82) (-3.57)  
***, **, * stands for significant at 99%, 95% and 90% level using a two-tailed binomial test separately 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: sample period after mandatory adoption of IFRS (2005-2010) 
 
                
   
Denmark 
 0.076*** 0.049** 0.0334** -0.0117 -0.074** 0.05 
t-stat (3.42) (2.55) (2.49) (-0.39) (-2.43)  
France 
 0.0256 0.0277 0.0018 0.0705*** 0.0025 0.01 
t-stat (1.54) (1.07) (0.17) (3.04) (0.09)  
Germany 
 0.030*** -0.042** -0.012 0.0164** 0.0672*** 0.05 
t-stat (5.48) (-2.37) (-1.60) (2.44) (2.71)  
Italy 
 0.102*** -0.016** 0.0025 -0.061*** 0.0165 0.06 
t-stat (7.95) (-2.10) (0.44) (-3.37) (0.92)  
Netherland 
 0.058*** -0.06*** 0.0001 -0.0197 -0.0009 0.07 
t-stat (5.06) (-2.70) (0.01) (-1.11) (-0.03)  
Spain 
 0.048** 0.0037 0.0189* -0.05 -0.036 0.02 
t-stat (2.10) (0.27) (1.76) (-1.39) (-1.56)  
Sweden 
 0.048*** -0.009 -0.022 0.007 0.0576 0.02 
t-stat (3.21) (-0.25) (-1.60) (0.34) (1.10)  
Switzerland 
 0.0128* -0.045*** -0.0083 0.01311 0.0316 0.02 
t-stat (1.80) (-3.78) (-1.20) (0.94) (1.63)  
UK 
 0.043*** 0.0291*** -0.0042 -0.064*** -0.0038 0.02 
t-stat (7.40) (3.02) (-0.57) (-8.93) (-0.27)  
***, **, * stands for significant at 99%, 95% and 90% level using a two-tailed binomial test separately 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Mishkin Test of the Market Efficiency-Earning Components-By countries 
                                      
                                    
    
        
              
Panel A: Mishkin Test of the components of earning (1994-2010)-by countries 
Country n         
       
  
Demark 1297 0.5209 0.8001 0.4235 0.6489 0.5954 
France 4471 0.8722 0.7300 0.5430 0.7066 0.5636 
Italy 1629 0.9725 0.7699 0.3702 0.7643 0.5117 
Netherland 1258 1.1792 0.7487 0.6372 0.7212 0.7905 
Sweden 2243 1.0331 0.7921 0.4903 0.6522 0.4194 
Switzerland 1742 1.43336 0.8294 0.7194 0.7101 0.7500 
Germany 4989 0.4681 0.6845 0.0893 0.5198 0.1419 
United Kingdom 8074 0.3264 0.7755 0.0524 0.6853 0.2292 
Spain 325 1.2459 0.8165 0.6278 0.7403 0.4909 
European 
Countries(pooled) 
17954 0.6941 0.7181 0.3803 0.6503 0.4070 
 
Panel B: Mishkin Test of the components of earning (1994-2004)-by countries 
Country n         
       
  
Demark 854 0.5002 0.6042 0.1992 0.5220 0.1655 
France 2144 1.1127 0.7624 0.6175 0.7407 0.6358 
Italy 782 1.1420 0.6758 0.3103 0.7215 0.6165 
Netherland 820 1.2978 0.7370 0.6582 0.6918 0.8208 
Sweden 1033 1.0843 0.7944 0.4484 0.6507 0.1743 
Switzerland 1036 1.6494 0.8002 0.6826 0.6818 0.7179 
Germany 2275 0.5873 0.6773 -0.0253 0.5293 -0.0358 
United Kingdom 4103 0.4234 0.8194 0.3074 0.7104 0.4808 
European 
Countries(pooled) 
8961 0.7838 0.7109 0.3407 0.6540 0.3573 
 
Panel C: Mishkin Test of the components of earning (2004-2010)-by countries 
Country n         
       
  
Demark 364 0.6599 1.0094 0.6328 0.6865 1.1358 
France 1923 0.6974 0.6938 0.4470 0.6754 0.4427 
Italy 718 0.9407 0.8762 0.5929 0.7827 0.4250 
Netherland 355 0.7739 0.7380 0.3730 0.7680 0.4720 
Sweden 1028 1.0504 0.7811 0.4977 0.6459 0.5927 
Switzerland 584 1.1969 0.8408 0.7514 0.7424 0.7723 
Germany 2269 0.3787 0.6718 0.1105 0.4855 0.2178 
United Kingdom 3432 0.3021 0.7620 -0.0074 0.6992 -0.0281 
European 
Countries(pooled) 
7544 0.6139 0.7149 0.3823 0.6274 0.4030 
 
 
Table 6: Mishkin Test of the Market Efficiency-with Accrual Components 
                                                              
                                 
    
        
                   
                       
Panel A: Mishkin Test of the components of accrual (1994-2010)-by countries 
Country n         
       
       
  
Demark 1297 0.5376 0.8283 0.4751 0.1232 -0.1495 0.6987 0.6678 
France 4471 0.8647 0.7385 0.5105 0.3180 2.1483 0.7141 0.5317 
Italy 1629 0.9462 0.7848 0.3260 0.0421 2.1128 0.7796 0.4706 
Netherland 1258 1.1838 0.7550 0.6543 0.6480 0.5950 0.7341 0.8244 
Sweden 2243 1.0208 0.8017 0.4630 0.3345 1.1961 0.6685 0.3766 
Switzerland 1742 1.4498 0.8188 0.7039 1.0406 1.2739 0.6934 0.7231 
Germany 4989 0.4680 0.6845 0.0904 0.4863 1.5090 0.5199 0.1369 
United 
Kingdom 
8074 0.3273 0.7763 0.0572 0.4517 -0.5498 0.6908 0.2488 
Spain 325 1.2627 0.8402 0.6663 0.1494 -0.4058 0.7616 0.5267 
European 
Countries 
17954 0.6911 0.7246 0.3673 0.2535 1.1120 0.6568 0.3945 
 
Panel B: Mishkin Test of the components of accrual (1994-2004)-by countries 
Country n         
       
       
  
Demark 854 0.5099 0.6336 0.2365 0.0926 -0.2585 0.5726 0.2231 
France 1923 0.6936 0.6971 0.4028 0.5262 2.3876 0.6784 0.4015 
Italy 782 1.1399 0.6732 0.3131 0.3021 1.1879 0.7211 0.6169 
Netherland 820 1.3037 0.7450 0.6772 0.6109 0.6338 0.7077 0.8568 
Sweden 1033 1.0837 0.8084 0.4463 0.3473 0.2151 0.6655 0.1720 
Switzerland 1036 1.6819 0.7989 0.6834 1.1298 1.2528 0.6641 0.6960 
Germany 2269 0.3787 0.6765 0.1103 0.1715 0.2299 0.4927 0.2175 
United 
Kingdom 
4103 0.4310 0.8221 0.3306 0.5201 -0.5439 0.7223 0.5491 
European 
Countries 
8961 0.7812 0.7163 0.3293 0.1106 1.3820 0.6588 0.3473 
 
Panel C: Mishkin Test of the components of accrual (2005-2010)-by countries 
Country n         
       
       
  
Demark 364 0.6534 1.0215 0.6104 0.4265 1.5381 0.7132 1.0994 
France 2144 1.1071 0.7708 0.6050 0.2793 1.2797 0.7495 0.6230 
Italy 718 0.9285 0.8800 0.5506 0.6392 1.9019 0.7884 0.3613 
Netherland 355 0.7735 0.7417 0.3710 0.7021 0.5038 0.7792 0.4664 
Sweden 1028 1.0378 0.7871 0.4676 0.4227 1.5768 0.6607 0.5271 
Switzerland 584 1.1967 0.8395 0.7583 0.7684 0.6322 0.7409 0.7806 
Germany 2275 0.5867 0.6672 -0.0181 0.0989 0.2987 0.5264 -0.0341 
United 
Kingdom 
3432 0.3017 0.7621 -0.0087 -0.5335 1.432 0.7042 -0.035 
European 
Countries 
7544 0.6102 0.7238 0.3680 0.2410 0.9412 0.6374 0.3876 
 
 
 
Table 7: Earning Management Controlled for Country Characteristics 
Panel A: sample period (1994-2004) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
RD -0.009** -0.011 -0.0031 0.0048 
 
(-2.31) (-1.25) (-0.37) (0.65) 
Return -0.031*** -0.01 -0.012 0.0022 
 
(-5.11) (-0.78) (-0.96) (0.27) 
PPE  
 
 
-0.0146 
 
 
 
 
(-1.21) 
Return*RD 0.206*** 0.152*** 0.014 0.0099 
 
(26.55) (8.99) (0.88) (0.89) 
PPE*RD  
 
 
-0.0224 
 
 
 
 
(-1.28) 
Law Enforcement  0.025*** 0.0161 0.001 0.0024 
 
(3.91) (1.17) (0.08) (0.18) 
IFRS difference 0.003*** 0.0015 0.0002 0.0001 
 
(4.46) (0.96) (0.14) (0.04) 
Accrual Index 0.2725*** 0.199** 0.135 0.134 
 
(6.72) (2.26) (1.62) (1.61) 
Ownership Concentration 0.261*** 0.182** 0.112 0.129* 
 
(7.29) (2.33) (1.51) (1.75) 
Anti-Director  -0.013*** -0.013* -0.0014 0.0001 
 
(-3.52) (-1.68) (-0.19) (0.02) 
Equity Market Importance 0.0028*** 0.0018** 0.0023*** 0.0025*** 
 
(8.65) (2.59) (3.50) (3.74) 
  0.10 0.02 0.002 0.003 
Model1: 
                                                                                        
                                   
Model 2:                                                                                  
                                   
Model 3:                                                                                      
                                   
Model 4:                                                                               
                                                              
***, **, * stands for significant at 99%,95% and 90% level using a two-tailed binomial test separately 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B: sample period (2004-2010) 
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
RD -0.12** -0.024*** 0.0004 -0.0013 
 
(-1.90) (-3.87) (0.10) (-0.38) 
Return 0.007 -0.0054 -0.005 0.0392*** 
 
(0.74) (-0.56) (-0.70) (11.42) 
PPE  
 
 
0.0139** 
 
 
 
 
(2.34) 
Return*RD 0.151*** 0.1214*** 0.019** -0.027*** 
 
(12.83) (10.14) (2.10) (-6.31) 
PPE*RD  
 
 
0.0067 
 
 
 
 
(0.84) 
Law Enforcement  -0.008 -0.0103* -0.0101** -0.011** 
 
(-1.26) (-1.67) (-2.19) (-2.30) 
Ownership Concentration 0.054* 0.046 0.066** 0.063** 
 
(1.59) (1.33) (2.55) (2.44) 
Anti-Director  -0.02*** -0.019*** 0.0114*** 0.0097*** 
 
(-5.58) (-5.12) (4.22) (3.57) 
Equity Market Importance 0.002*** 0.0025 0.004 0.0005 
 
(4.38) (5.05) (1.13) (1.42) 
  0.06 0.04   
Model1:                                                                               
                   
Model 2: 
                                                                                          
Model 3: 
                                                                                              
Model 4:                                                                              
                                   
***, **, * stands for significant at 99%, 95% and 90% level using a two-tailed binomial test separately 
